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The Rules of the Game and the Morality of
Efficient Breach
Gregory Klass*
Because contractual obligations result from acts of agreement, every
contract has an origin story-a story about what the parties did to change
their legal situation, to enter into a contract. Theories of contract law, in
turn, often tell stylized versions of such stories. These theory stories tell us
about the character of the parties, what they want from their transaction,
how they arrive at an agreement, and how the law figures into their
relationship.
The theory of efficient breach is no exception. It depicts contracting
parties as self-interested rational utility seekers engaged in a value creating
exchange, who are highly sensitive to legal incentives and want to
maximize the value of the transaction, which they divide according to their
relative bargaining power. The theory then tells stories about what can
happen when performance turns out to be inefficient, whether because the
out-of-pocket costs of performing increase or because a better opportunity
comes along. In one story, the parties attempt to negotiate a release. But
because they have no one else to deal with and each wants only to
maximize its own profit, they end up wasting resources agreeing on an
exit price. In another story, one side realizes that its performance will be
inefficient and is given a cheaply exercised option to avoid performing, by
paying off the other side. The difference in transaction costs provides the
stories' moral: it is better to structure remedies so that when one side's
performance becomes inefficient it can breach and pay, rather than forcing
it to negotiate a release. Thus the law's preference for expectation
damages.
To say that the efficient breach theory tells stories is not to say that the
theory is false. It is difficult to find a theory of contract law that does not
include such narrative elements. If the theory of efficient breach is
different, it is because it has a surprise ending. We might think that breach
* Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am
grateful for comments I received on this article at the Georgetown Law Summer Workshop and the
Yale-UCL Workshop on the Philosophy of Contract, and from helpful conversations and
correspondence with Hanoch Dagan, Guillermo Garcia-Sanchez, Naomi Mezey, Claire Salinas and
Jessica Silbert.
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is a wrong that contract law is designed to prevent or rectify. The efficient
breach stories suggest that some breaches are good things, and that
contract remedies are designed to encourage them.
Carol Rose observed over twenty-five years ago that the stories we tell
about the law are not inert. "[T]he storyteller, by structuring the
audience's experience and imagination, helps to turn her audience into a
moral community."' The efficient breach theory tells a story about the
attitudes of contracting parties and the purposes of contract law. In doing
so, it invites the audience to imagine a particular moral community, one in
which the audience's naYve assumptions about promissory obligations and
the law's attitude toward them do not apply. And by inviting legal actors
to imagine that community, the theory can help bring it about. We use
theory-stories not only to explain and understand the law, but also to guide
our actions in relation to it.
In his 1939 film, La R~gle du Jeu, or "The Rules of the Game," Jean
Renoir imagines a society in which the familiar norms of marital fidelity
do not apply. The film is set in the upper echelons of French society,
which Renoir depicts as highly rule governed. There is a right and a wrong
way to do everything from seat guests at dinner to hunt small game. But
the rules of that society are not those of traditional or petit bourgeois
morality. In particular, the film depicts marital infidelity as a transgression
that is generally tolerated, so long as it is done in the correct way. Like the
theory of efficient breach, La R~gle du Jeu tells a story in which the
conventional rules do not apply, but are replaced by a different and, it
turns out, in some respects more demanding social morality.
This article identifies and explores multiple similarities between the
theory of efficient breach and the story Renoir tells in La Rgle du Jeu.
Telling the stories together shines a light on often overlooked aspects of
the theory of efficient breach. Many readers might not have seen the film.
But its setting, characters and storyline employ familiar elements and are
easily retold. In fact, the film's narrative is somewhat more accessible than
some nuances of the efficient breach theory. Renoir's story can therefore
be used to access underappreciated aspects of the theory.
At the risk of giving away my story's ending, I identify six points of
contact between the film and the theory.
First, both depict a practice in which nominal transgressions of the rules
are widely tolerated. In the film, marital infidelity is generally expected
and accepted; in the theory, breach of contract is sometimes desirable.
Second, in both the film and the theory, because participants in the
practice understand that those transgressions are tolerated, participants do
not wrong one another in committing them. Everyone understands that

1. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectivesfrom Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 37, 55 (1990); see also Robin West, Economic Man and
Literary Woman: One Contrast,39 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1988).
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such actions are a part of the game they are playing. This common
understanding belies naive moral criticisms of the efficient breach theory
as encouraging the moral wrong of breaking a promise.
Third, it nonetheless remains possible to identify correct and incorrect
ways to commit those transgressions. The film depicts a practice of marital
infidelity governed by rules of discretion and detachment. A fully
elaborated theory of efficient breach requires of the nonperforming party
transparency and responsibility. Although the rules are different, in both
cases nominally transgressive behavior remains rule governed.
Fourth, violations of those deeper rules are not priced but punished. In
the film, characters who violate the rules of infidelity are banished from
the society. A fully articulated theory of efficient breach recommends
penalties or other supercompensatory remedies for breaching parties who
refuse to pay damages or otherwise obstruct their recovery-a point that
both courts and theorists too often overlook.
Fifth, even if participants in the practice do not wrong one another when
they commit nominal violations, it remains possible to inquire into the
moral value of the practice itself. Renoir depicts a society governed by
rules, including the rules of marital infidelity, that work to prevent
authentic forms of romantic love. Similarly, a practice of efficient breach
might result in a form of sociability that we do not find valuable. In both
cases, however, the question cannot be answered in the abstract. The value
of any given social practice depends on who the participants are and the
social context in which the practice occurs.
Finally, one should worry about the effects of such practices on those
who do not understand or choose not to participate in them. In the film this
point is illustrated by two characters, each of whom wants more traditional
or authentic relationships than the practice of marital infidelity permits,
and each of whom suffers as a result. The risk with respect to efficient
breach is realized when nonsophisticates enter into transactions not
understanding that the other side intends to breach if efficient.
The last three points reveal features of the efficient breach theory that
are too often overlooked or underappreciated. The theory is not only
compatible with but recommends punishing some contractual wrongs.
Even if sophisticated parties are playing the game of efficient breach, we
should ask about the moral value of the attitudes and relationships that the
theory engenders. And we should worry about extending the theory
beyond its premises, and especially to contracts involving parties who are
not playing the game of efficient breach.
My use of La R~gle du Jeu to explore the theory of efficient breach is
somewhat different from other approaches to law and literature. I am
neither looking for the law's appearances in the film (almost nowhere),
nor applying the methods of literary interpretation or film criticism to
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theories of efficient breach.2 Instead I am using elements of Renoir's story
in La Rgle du Jeu to explain facets of the efficient breach theory. I see
three reasons to explore the perhaps surprising parallels between the film
and the theory.
First, the commonly told story of efficient breach is too simple along
several dimensions. La R~gle du Jeu, which also depicts a social practice
that tolerates and even celebrates nominal transgressions, points the way
toward a more complete account of efficient breaches.
Second, the film also points the way to a more complete account of the
theory's moral implications. 3 Legal theory commonly works by
simplifying the world; literature and film commonly emphasize
complexity. The standard story of efficient breach has an Aesopian
structure: familiar characters engage in a stylized interaction to bring
home a relatively simple moral. Renoir's tells a more layered story in La
Rgle du Jeu. The film does not have a single protagonist, but multiple,
complex characters who interact and impact one another in various ways.
The large cast and the film's narrative arc allow Renoir to depict a social
practice that means different things to different people at different times. I
argue that social meaning, and moral value, of the theory of efficient
breach is similarly complex-a fact that simple efficient breach stories do
not capture, and which both the theory's proponents and its critics too
often ignore.
Finally, that the film and the theory, properly understood, share these
structural features is itself an interesting and important fact. Law is in
significant respects autonomous. But it is a social practice like others. The
parallels between the film and the theory of efficient breach are striking.
That said, perhaps we should not be so surprised that the twists and turns
of a legal theory finds an analog in the depiction of another highly rulegoverned set of social relationships.
Part 1 of this article briefly introduces La Rgle du Jeu and its
characters. Part 2 provides an introduction to the theory of efficient breach
and draws parallels to the attitude toward marital infidelity depicted in the
film. Part 3 dives deeper into the film and the theory, arguing that the
tolerated transgressions in both nonetheless remain highly rule-governed,
and that the theory of efficient breach in particular leaves room for
penalizing violations of its internal morality. Part 4 steps outside of the
efficient breach theory and argues that Renoir's critical attitude towards
the society the film depicts suggests two nonstandard moral criticisms of
the theory of efficient breach.
Before jumping into the analysis, a few methodological comments. The
first concerns my use of the film. I do not pretend to present a complete
2. See Peter Brooks, Literature as Law's Other, 22 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 349, 350 (2010)
(identifying various approaches to law and literature).
3. I'm grateful to Jessica Silbey for helping me see this point.
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theory of La R~gle du Jeu. Like many great works of art, the film
functions on multiple levels and has more than one message. My aim is to
plunder it to say something interesting about the theory of efficient breach.
Nor do I aim at completeness in even that. There is yet more one might
say about the connections between the film and the theory. I largely
ignore, for example, the subject of gender. Carol Rose has argued that
prisoners' dilemma stories, which employ many of the same assumptions
of the efficient breach theory, are deeply gendered.4 So too is the society
depicted in the film, providing yet another interesting point of potential
comparison. If I do not pursue those lines of analysis here, it is because I
want to highlight other underappreciated aspects of the efficient breach
theory. As usual, there is more one might say.
Second, readers might wonder why I do not address the structural
similarities between marriage and contract. Given that marriages involve
an exchange of vows, might we say that marital infidelity as depicted in
the film is itself a form of efficient breach? I think not. Although spouses
voluntarily undertake their marital obligations, traditionally the content of
those obligations is not a matter of agreement. The marital obligations,
nominal and actual, that the film depicts are not chosen obligations in the
way contract duties are. They are imposed by society. This difference
between marriage and contract is more significant than the similarities
between the two.
The final comment concerns this article's attitude toward the theory of
efficient breach. My question is not whether that story, or the theory, is
correct. It is, rather, about the moral community it depicts. I therefore
devote relatively few words to whether or not the efficient breach theory
succeeds. There are reasons to doubt both the model that the theory
employs and whether the theory succeeds within that model. I have
discussed the theory's debilities in considerable detail elsewhere.' Robert
Scott, who with Charles Goetz coined the term "efficient breach," now
believes that the theory describes very few breaches.
It was a nice try but, in fact, the theory does not fit the data well.
There are very few examples in the case law of an efficient breach
in which one party has chosen not to perform and instead offered
to pay the expectation damages that are subsequently assessed by
the court. 6
Despite the theory's defects, I would invite the skeptical reader to suspend
her disbelief. Over the past four decades, the theory of efficient breach has
become an important part of the story US scholars and jurists tell about the
remedies for breach of contract. Regardless of whether the theory is

4.

Carol Rose, Game Stories, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 369 (2010).

5. Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 362
(Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai, eds., 2014).

6.

Robert E. Scott, ContractLaw and the Shading Problem, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2015).
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successful or descriptively correct, it is today part of the background
understanding of contract remedies.' It makes an appearance in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 8 and several state high courts and
federal Courts of Appeals have expressed official approval of the theory.'
As such, it is worth considering it on its own terms.
I. JEAN RENOIR'S LA R"GLE DUJEU
The history of La R~gle du Jeu is a strange one. 10 When Renoir made
the film in 1939, he was already a well-known director, having produced
among other films Boudu sauvi des eaux (1932, later remade as Down and
Out in Beverly Hills (1986)), La Grande Illusion (1937), and La B&te
Humaine (1938), all of which were popular and critical successes. La
R~gle du Jeu was a popular disaster. As a result, the original one-hundred
and thirteen minute film was cut to ninety and then eighty-five minutes.
The Nazis subsequently blacklisted the film, and in 1942 an Allied
bombing raid destroyed the negatives and the only complete cut. The
version commonly available today, which I discuss, is a 1958
reconstruction. Two film enthusiasts created it with Renoir's help using
remaining prints, negatives and found fragments.
La R~gle du Jeu follows the structure of a classic French comedy, with
multiple characters involved in complex and overlapping romantic
entanglements." The action takes place in 1939, the first twenty minutes
in Paris and the remaining hour and twenty minutes at La Colinibre, a
7. A search run on January 31, 2016 of all US judicial opinions in Westlaw for the term "efficient
breach" and excluding cases in which Judge Posner was on the panel returned one-hundred and eightythree results. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Influence of Law and Economics Scholarship on
Contract Law: Impressions Twenty-Five Years Later, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 2 (2012)
(concluding from an empirical study of judicial opinions that "it is clear that law and economics
scholarship, at least in the context of contract law, has affected the vocabulary and reasoning of
courts").
8. Chapter 16: IntroductoryNote, in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 99-100 (1983).

9.

See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1133-34 (11th Cir. 2004) ("It is not

illegal for a party to breach a contract; a contract gives a party two equally viable options (perform or
pay compensation), between which it is generally at liberty to choose. A "promise" contained in a
contract is . . . a grant of a legal right to the other party to either enjoy performance or receive
damages. Indeed, the whole notion of "efficient breach" is that a party should abrogate its contractual
responsibilities if a more profitable opportunity comes along."); Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc.,

841 F. 2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he breach did little, perhaps no, damage to either plaintiff, and

it is therefore quite possible that it was an efficient breach in the sense that it increased MidContinent's profits by more than it caused anyone losses. If so, the refusal to rectify the breach, while
deliberate, would not justify an award of punitive damages."); Bhole, Inc. v. Shore Investments, Inc.,

67 A.3d 444, 453 n.39. (Del. 2013) ("Delaware recognizes this principle of efficient breach.");
Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 500 (S.D. 1997) ("[O]ur free market system

allows economically efficient breaches of contract."); Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 774
(Mont. 1990) ("Parties have traditionally been free to breach their contract and pay contract damages
whenever performance was not economically efficient."); L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 665

S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. 1984) ("The law has long recognized the view that a contracting party has the
option to breach a contract and pay damages if it is more efficient to do so.").
10. See generally Historical Note, in RULES OF THE GAME: A FILM BY JEAN RENOIR 19-21 (J.
McGrath & Maureen Teitelbaum trans., 1970) [hereinafter "SCREENPLAY"].
11. See ALEXANDER SESONSKE, JEAN RENOIR: THE FRENCH FILMS, 1924-1939, 391-92 (1980).
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country estate. The characters can be divided into two groups: those who
belong to the Parisian upper class and those who belong to the servant
class working for them. The primary characters in each can be organized
according to their relationships to a focal marriage in that group.
Among the upper-class characters, the focal marriage is that between
Robert and Christine de la Cheyniest. Robert is wealthy marquis and owns
La Colinibre. His wife Christine grew up in Salzburg, the daughter of a
famous conductor. There are three other principal upper-class characters,
each of whom has a romantic relationship with either Robert or Christine.
Genevibve de Marras is a modem, sophisticated single woman and has
maintained an ongoing affair with Robert since before his marriage. Andr6
Jurieux is a handsome young pilot who in the opening scene has just
completed a solo flight across the Atlantic and is madly in love with
Christine. Octave-played by Renoir-is a failed conductor, Andr6's
close friend, and an old friend of Christine's, having studied with her
father. There is a suggestion that Octave survives at least in part through
Robert's generosity. Late in the film Octave professes his romantic love
for Christine, and she for him.
Among the servants, the focal marriage is between Lisette and Edouard
Schumacher. Lisette serves as Chistine's chambermaid and therefore
resides mostly in Paris. Her husband, whom everyone refers to with the
Gallicized "Shumach6," is the gamekeeper at La Colinibre. During the
film the audience sees Lisette in two affairs. The first is a lighthearted and
flirtatious relationship with Octave, acted out in Paris and before Octave's
romantic encounter with Christine. Lisette's second affair is with
Marceau, a poacher whom Robert hires, much to Schumacher's
consternation, as a low-level servant at La Colinibre.
Spouses

Lovers

Robert de la Cheyniest
(the host)

Genevieve de Marras
(the sophisticate)

II
Christine de la Cheyniest
(the hostess)
UpSti

Andr6 Jurieux
(the pilot)
Octave
(the friend)

Downstairs

Lisette Schumacher
(the chambermaid)

I I
Edouard Schumacher
(the gamekeeper)

Marceau
(the poacher)
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La Rtgle du Jeu addresses many themes, including the mechanics of
social class, the feel on the eve of the Second World War, the violence of
war itself, and its characters' beliefs, motives and desires. Here I focus on
one: the rules governing marriage and infidelity in upper-class pre-war
Parisian society, as depicted in the film.
In that society, infidelity is a common and tolerated transgression. In the
first scene, Andr6-who has just landed in a field outside Paris-declares
over the radio that he has flown across the Atlantic out of love for a
woman. The audience immediately learns that she is the married Christine,
and the next scene finds Christine and Lisette discussing Lisette's many
lovers. Then, after a brief interchange between Christine and Robert, in
which Robert acknowledges that Andr6 was speaking of Christine, the
audience learns of Robert's relationship with Genevi&ve. In her first
scene-still in the first ten minutes of the film-Genevieve quotes
Chamfort: "Love, such as it exists in high society, is merely an exchange
of whims and the contact of skins." 2
At the same time, marital infidelity is tolerated only within certain
bounds. Infidelity is a rule-governed transgression. Extrapolating from the
film as a whole, the two most important rules are that parties keep the
affair discrete and that they remain emotionally detached. The film's plot
is driven forward by violations those rules. Those violations all involve the
two Austrian characters, Christine and Schumacher, each of whom
misunderstands or rejects the local rules of infidelity.
Christine's desire for authentic attachments and honesty are apparent
from her first scene, in which she suggests to Lisette that genuine
friendship with a man might be possible. Lisette, who is French and
understands the rules, replies, "You might as well talk of the moon in
broad daylight." 13 A short while later, talking to Robert about their affair,
Genevibve diagnoses Christine's attitude:
Christine has remained very much a product of her country. A
Parisienne would understand. Not her! ... If she learns the truth, it
will not be because of our liaison that she'll be upset with you, it
will be because of your having lied to her from the time you got
married. 14
As the film progresses, one man after another in Christine's life breaks the
rules of infidelity out of love for her. In the opening scene, Andr6 violates
the rule of discretion when he publicly declares his love for Christine in a
way that Robert and the others immediately understand, for which Octave
upbraids him. Shortly after, Robert discusses the matter with Christine,
12. SCREENPLAY, supra note 10, at 37-38. "L'amour, tel qu'il existe dans la socid, est '&hange
de deuxfantaisies et le contact de deux dpidermes." I have slightly revised the screenplay's translation.
See Deke Dusinberre, Limits of Translation, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 24, 1992), available at:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1992/sep/24/limits-of-translation/.

13.
14.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 39.
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who thanks him for his honesty. Christine's authenticity and naivet6 then
cause Robert to resolve to end his longstanding affair with Genevibve-a
resolution he is too weak to follow through on, but which begins to disrupt
their otherwise functioning affair. Later in the film, Octave's love for
Christine cause him to send Andr6 out to meet her, leading to the film's
tragic ending. And then there are Christine's own actions. After finally
discovering Robert's affair with Genevibve, for example, she decides to
take as a lover a relatively minor and unsympathetic character, SaintAubin. But she does so in such a brazen and clumsy way that both Robert
and Andr6 see what is happening, resulting in a series of physical
altercations and then general chaos.
If the upstairs plot is driven largely by Christine and her lovers'
breaches of the rules of infidelity, the plot downstairs is driven by
Schumacher's inability to recognize that infidelity is a transgression to be
tolerated. Schumacher consistently acts on the belief that his marriage to
Lisette is governed by the traditional, public rules of marriage, including
that a wife should live with her husband and remain faithful to him. But
Lisette is an enthusiastic player at infidelity. In her first scene, she
explains to Christine that she has affairs, including one with Octave, and
suggests that she does not take any of it seriously. Schumacher, who lives
at La Colinibre while Lisette is in Paris, is oblivious to all this. His simple
adherence to public conventions and rules serves as comic fodder in much
of the film. In one of Schumacher's first scenes, he laments to his
underlings that it is impossible to control the rabbit population, and then in
the next breath complains that Marceau has again been poaching them.
Schumacher is generally blind to the occasional advantages of
transgression. After Robert hires Marceau to serve in the house, the
poacher enters into a lighthearted affair with Lisette, which Schumacher,
with his rigid adherence to the rules, cannot understand or accept. The
remainder of the downstairs plot is driven by Schumacher's ignorance of,
then outrage at, his wife's infidelity, culminating in an extended comic
chase through the house, during which Schumacher empties his pistol in
an attempt to kill Marceau.
The structure of La R~gle du Jeu therefore exhibits a bilateral
symmetry. The plot and relationships downstairs are something like mirror
images of the plot and relationships upstairs. One partner to each of the
focal marriages understands and plays by the rules of infidelity. Upstairs
this is Robert, downstairs it is Lisette. Each is married to a foreigner who
does not play by those rules. Robert is married to Christine, who acts out
of love and values honesty, both of which run contrary to the local rules of
infidelity. Lisette is married to Schumacher, who is attached to the public
and petit bourgeois rules of marriage, which forbid infidelity altogether.
The plot is driven by Christine's failure to follow the rules of infidelity
and by Schumacher's failure to understand that infidelity is a transgression
to be tolerated.
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This then is the basic structure of La R~gle du Jeu. The full plot and cast
of characters are complex and convoluted enough to preclude easy
summary. Although I will describe many other pieces of the film, it will
help the discussion that follows to reveal its ending. After numerous
conflicts and adventures produced by the many extramarital liaisons, four
characters are effectively banished from the society at La Colinibre. After
the chase through the mansion, Robert dismisses Schumacher from his
service, and then also Marceau. Having together left the house,
Schumacher and Marceau believe they see Octave together with Lisette.
Although Octave did once have an affair with Lisette, in fact they are
seeing Octave professing his love to Christine. Schumacher and Marceau
go to get Schumacher's gun. Octave goes inside the house, is convinced
by Lisette that he cannot support Christine, and out of love for Christine
allows Andre to take his place. Schumacher and Marceau return.
Schumacher, now under the double misperception that Andre is Octave
and Christine is Lisette, shoots and kills Andr6. Octave is crushed, not in
the least because of his role in Andrd's death. As dawn approaches,
Octave departs from La Colini&re on foot to make his way back to Paris.
The net result is that all three male lovers plus Schumacher leave La
Coliniere, one in a coffin.
In the final scene, Robert explains to the remaining guests that Andre's
shooting was a "deplorable accident ... My keeper Schumacher thought
he saw a poacher, and he fired, since that is his duty."" Saint-Aubin, who
has played a minor role in the debacle, comments that this is a new
definition of the word "accident," to which a senior gentleman, referred to
as "the General," replies: "No, no, no, no, no! La Chesnaye does not lack
class, and that is a rare thing, these days . . ., believe me, a rare thing!""
II.

EFFICIENT BREACH

One need not go all the way to French cinema to illustrate the idea that
rule breaking is sometimes acceptable. David and Daniel Luban observe
that many baseball players and fans consider some forms of cheating
permissible, and even part of the "fabric of the game." 7 Fans appreciate
the pitcher who can get away with scuffing the ball or smearing a bit of
Vaseline on it. They quote pitcher and manager George Bamberger:
There are rules, and there are consequences if you break them. If
you are a pro, then you often don't decide whether to cheat based

15. Id. at 168.
16. Id.
17. David Luban & Daniel Luban, Cheating in Baseball, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
BASEBALL 185, 186 (Leonard Cassuto & Stephen Partridge eds., 2011). Another example is the
practice of taking a dive in soccer. See Jer6 Longman, Routine Ruse in Men 's Soccer Tumbles Into
Women's World Cup, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2011, at Al.
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on if it's "right or wrong." You base it on whether or not you can
get away with it, and what the penalty might be."
Bamberger's attitude here is akin to that of Holmes's heuristic bad man,
"who cares only for the material consequences which [knowledge of the
law] enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience." 9 The art of cheating on this picture is the taking of
calculated risks. The sophisticated cheater weighs the possible gains of a
transgression against the consequences should she be caught, and
transgresses only when it is a good bet.
The theory of efficient breach tells a similar story about the law's
attitude towards some breaches of contract.20 Proponents of the theory
treat efficient breach as not only a tolerable transgression, but one the law
should encourage. Expectation damages are designed to give promisors a
reason to breach when nonperformance will create more value than will
performance. Robert Birmingham, who first articulated the theory in print,
explained the idea as follows:
Repudiation of the obligations should be encouraged where the
promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his
promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had
performance been rendered. Failure to honor an agreement under
these circumstances is a movement toward Pareto optimality....
To penalize such adjustments through overcompensation of the
innocent party is to discourage efficient allocation of resources.2 1
A breach is efficient when the net gains from nonperformance exceed the
net gains from performance, that is, when performing the contract would
reduce overall social welfare. Expectation damages encourage efficient
breach by allowing the breaching promisor to keep the gains from
nonperformance. Knowing that she will be required to put the
nonbreaching party in the position he would have occupied had she
performed, the promisor will choose to breach when and only when the
total gains from nonperformance exceed the total gains of performance.
According to the theory of efficient breach, this is a good thing. As
Birmingham says, "repudiation of the agreement should be encouraged
where gain to the [breaching party] will exceed loss to the [non-breaching
party]."22 Or Posner two years later: "If [the cost of performance] is
greater than the gain to the other party from completion, it is clear that

18.

Id. (quoting THOMAS BOSWELL, How LIFE IMITATES THE WORLD SERIES: AN INQUIRY INTO

THE GAME 198 (1982)).
19. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 110
HARV. L. REV. 991, 992 (1996-1997).
20.
21.

For a more thorough account of the theory of efficient breach, see Klass, supra note 5.
Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24

RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
22. Id. at 288-89.
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commission of the breach would be value maximizing and should be
encouraged." 23 Or Goetz and Scott a few years after that: "The modern
law of contract damages is based on the premise that a contractual
obligation is not necessarily an obligation to perform, but rather an
obligation to choose between performance and compensatory damages." 24
These and other first-generation social-welfare theories of efficient
breach were not entirely successful. 25 Here are two reasons, each internal
to the model. First, in some contracts specific performance, disgorgement
or even punitive damages might, when performance becomes inefficient,
result in a negotiated release, perhaps with lower overall transaction costs.
Second, the theory's exclusive focus on the perform-breach decision
neglects the incentives remedies create elsewhere in the transaction, such
as the promisee's incentives to rely on performance-incentives that
expectation damages might get wrong. More generally, the theory's
descriptive accuracy depends on empirical facts that are difficult to
observe and might differ across transactions. Hard empirical questions
include how much parties know about one another, the costs and
effectiveness of enforcement, the costs of bargaining for a release, and the
influence of nonlegal norms and practices. Without knowing those and
other facts, it is difficult to say which remedy maximizes overall welfare.
Despite these complications, the analysis that follows assumes that the
efficient breach theory could hold true in a significant number of
transactions. I am interested not in the theory's accuracy, but in the moral
and legal implications of the story it tells. For those purposes, it is enough
that the efficient breach theory could describe many transactions.
The early social-welfare efficient breach theorists treated contract
remedies as if they were similar to remedies elsewhere in the law. There
are, however, two important differences, which together form the basis of
a more nuanced theory of efficient breach. First, unlike, say, the tortfeasor
and tort victim, parties to a contract have the opportunity to agree in
advance on the legal rules that will govern their subsequent interactions.
Those rules include the remedy for breach. If parties are given the power
to choose the remedy, the design question is not simply what remedy, but

23. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 57 (1972).
24. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77

COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558 (1977).
25.

See Klass, supra note 5 at 370-79. A more complete list of internal problems with the simple

theory is as follows:
It fails to recognize that some breaches are not only inefficient, but opportunistic. It does not
provide a defense of expectation damages as against other possibly equally efficient
remedies. It focuses on the single perform-or-breach decision, when in fact remedial rules
provide incentives to act more or less efficiently across the whole of a transaction. And it
ignores other functions remedies serve, such as risk allocation and signaling.
Id. at 370.

Klass

2017]

83

what default remedy and how to tell when parties have contracted around
it.
Second, because contracts govern exchange transactions, the remedy
can affect the price or other terms a party receives. In a competitive
market, for example, a remedy that costs the seller more-say specific
performance rather than expectation damages-will result in a higher
price for the buyer. This price effect entails in the model that if a remedy
increases the overall gains of trade, both parties benefit, either ex ante in
the terms they receive or ex post by reaping the benefits of efficient
performance decisions. Parties themselves therefore want remedies that
increase the overall gains of trade, which is to say efficient remedies.
Later efficient breach theorists put these two observations together to
make a new claim: Because expectation damages are often efficient, they
are the remedy most parties would choose. Expectation damages are
therefore the right default. Setting the default at the remedy most parties
would choose saves those parties the transaction costs of specifying an
alternative, and gets most parties the remedy they prefer. Whereas the
early efficient breach theorists argued that expectation damages and
efficient breach are desirable because they increase overall social welfare,
later theorists argue that they are the rules sophisticated parties choose to
play by-which can also be an indicator of social welfare.
The choice-based efficient breach story also suffers from
complications. 26 Like the simple social-welfare theory, it assumes
empirical facts that are difficult to observe. Furthermore, if sophisticated
parties are the ones who prefer expectation damages, they are also the
ones with the knowledge and resources to contract for that remedy.
Perhaps the default should be set to match the expectations of
nonsophisticates. I again want to bracket such issues. I am not much
interested in the correct default, or even which remedy most parties do or
should prefer. For my purposes, it is enough that some parties might want
to treat their contractual arrangements in the way the efficient breach
theory describes. Again, I am interested more in the moral quality of the
story that the theory tells than its accuracy.
With choice-based efficient breach theory we arrive at an account of
contractual relationships and obligations very similar to Renoir's depiction
of marital relationships and obligations in La R~gle du Jeu. In the society
depicted in the film, though marriage nominally imposes an obligation of
fidelity, that obligation is widely understood to be a duty one need not
keep. When an opportunity for an affair presents itself, it is not morally
wrong to take it. According to the efficient breach theory, although many
contracts are written as if any failure to perform is a breach, sophisticated
parties enter into them expecting and even tolerating some types of

26.

See id at 384-86.
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nonperformance. Thus Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz argue that
contracts between sophisticated parties are best interpreted as promises to
perform or pay, or as they put it, the promisee agrees to give the promisor
a choice between performing the contract's "action term" and making a
transfer to the promisee in the amount of his expectation, "so that it is not
a breach when the promisor exercises the choice in favor of paying
money."27 The option to (nominally) breach and pay "is as real, as much a
product of the parties' actual intentions, as the promises that constitute the
action and price terms."28 Sophisticated parties are playing a game of
efficient breach that results in gains of trade that benefit everyone.
From this perspective, moralists who object to the theory of efficient
breach on the grounds that it encourages promise breaking are like the
hapless Schumacher, Lisette's Austrian husband. The gamekeeper does
not understand that his French wife and everyone else around him are
playing a game of love, sex and infidelity that is not at all like the
traditional, petit bourgeois institution of marriage he grew up with. As a
result, Schumacher comes off as a simpleton, and even a buffoon. Just as
his unthinking adherence to the rule against poaching prevents him from
seeing that Marceau the poacher is in fact helping him control the rabbit
population, Schumacher's unthinking adherence to the traditional rules of
marriage prevents him from understanding that his wife and the rest of the
cast around him are playing a very different, and perhaps more enjoyable
game. While Schumacher remains in his jackboots and warden's uniform
upright, uptight and unhappy, his French wife and Marceau the poacher
enjoy the pleasures of flirtation, seduction and romance. Schumacher's
offense at their pleasure comes from an inability to understand the rules of
the society in which he lives.
Many moral criticisms of the theory of efficient breach suffer from a
similar naivet6.29 Some contractual promises might be the equivalent of, in
27.

Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach. New Defenses of the

Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1976 (2011).
28. Id. at 1978.
Steven Shavell provides a somewhat different analysis that reaches the same result. Shavell focuses
on the unforeseen events that cause an efficient breach. He argues that if, at the time of contracting, the
parties had considered the possibility of such events, they would have agreed to no duty to perform in
those circumstances. The parties' failure to address those events is therefore a gap in their agreement,
which should be filled by looking to what they would have agreed to had they thought about the
possibility. By linking the parties' moral obligations to what they would have agreed to, Shavell can
conclude that an efficient breach is not immoral. See Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral,
56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006); Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the
Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (2008).
Seana Shiffrin and I have each argued that there are reasons to doubt such interpretations of the
content of contractual promises. See Gregory Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143

(2012); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA. L. REV.
159 (2012). For more from Shiffrin on the interpretive question, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Could

Breach of ContractBe Immoral, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1563-67 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1989)
("The efficient breach theory is in fundamental conflict with a basic premise of both the common law
and other Western legal systems, namely, that property (including contractual rights) is not to be taken
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schoolyard parlance, "cross your heart and hope to die." And in some
contexts, such as a promise between friends or intimates, the promisor's
choice to breach and pay damages might be morally offensive. But it is
parochial to take these local features of some promissory practices as
necessary truths about the duties that attach to exchange agreements.
Agreements and agreement keeping are social institutions. And an
agreement's content and moral force depend at least in part on what the
parties say and expect, which in turn depend on the context in which they
transact. If sophisticated parties benefit from a duty that permits efficient
breaches, and if that is how the parties themselves understand the
commitments they undertake, then what is the harm in structuring contract
remedies to assist them in realizing those ends? Contracts between
sophisticated parties occur in a social spaces in which nominal violations
are not only permissible, but even expected and encouraged. They are, in a
sense, not in fact breaches-though they trigger a legal duty to pay
damages. So long as the players understand the rules of the game, why
should they not be given the benefit of playing it?
III. The Rules of the Game
Let me return for a moment to my domestic example: baseball.
Although David and Daniel Luban maintain that baseball fans treat some
forms of cheating not only as permissible, but as part of the fabric of the
game, they also distinguish between "good cheating" and "bad
cheating." 30 Some cheating is presumably wrongful because it is morally
wrong and just happens to occur in the context of baseball. The bean
ball-a pitch aimed at the batter's head-would be an example. But the
Lubans make a stronger claim. Some cheating is bad because it violates
the "natural law of baseball: a code designed to maintain the balance
and given to another without the owner's consent."); Daniel Freidmann, The Performance Interest in
ContractDamages, 111 L.Q. REv. 628, 629 (1995) ("The essence of contract is performance.... This
is the only pure contractual interest."); Douglas
interest in getting the promised performance . .
Laycock, Holmes, Posner and Efficient Breach, in THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE
245, 255 (1991) ("The law's preference for specific relief ... rests on views of morality and justice
that run deep in Western culture. A promise creates an entitlement that should be honored."); Richard
O'Dair, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract and the Theory of Efficient Breach: Some
Reflections, 46 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 113, 119 (1993) ("If the conversion of chattels is not
legitimated by the tender of their value by way of compensatory damages payment, why should a
promisor be able to deprive a promisee of his contractual rights merely by proffering the appropriate
sum by way of expectation damages?"); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and
Promise, 120 HARV. L. REv. 708, 731 (2007) ("A virtuous agent cannot believe both that a promise
can be binding even if a better opportunity comes along that competes with fulfilling the promise and
that breach of contract, involving breach of promise, is, all things considered, morally justified merely
because it leads to (even only marginally) greater economic welfare."); Shiffrin, Could Breach of
Contract Be Immoral, supra note 28, at 1552 ("The efficient-breach rationale forwards a justification
for a legal doctrine that consists in the claim that barring punitive damages would encourage and
facilitate certain breaching behavior. But this behavior is condemned by morality. To the extent the
law adopts and embodies this rationale, it thereby embraces and tries to encourage and facilitate
immoral behavior.").
30. Luban & Luban, supranote 17 at 188.

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

86

[Vol. 29:1

between batter and pitcher, the basic balance that sets the entire texture of
the game." 31 Arguably in this category is the rule that a hitter may not
peek behind to see how the catcher is setting up. When a hitter knows
what pitch is going to come, it makes baseball a worse game. "The rules
that matter are the rules that keep baseball as near to perfect as it can be.
Breaking those rules is cheating; breaking the lesser rules is simply good
dirty fun." 32 If the Lubans are correct, one can distinguish between the
virtuous and the nonvirtuous cheater in baseball. Though the virtuous
cheater will be penalized when caught, his transgressions do not disrupt
the fundamentals of the game. The nonvirtuous cheater, in distinction,
threatens to undermine the game. His transgressions cannot be tolerated.
A. Rules of Infidelity
One finds a similar distinction in La Rigle du Jeu. Although the film
depicts a society in which the cognoscenti treat infidelity as a
transgression to be tolerated and even enjoyed, it does not follow that
anything goes-Cole Porter notwithstanding. The film depicts friendship,
employer-servant relations, the relationship between a host and his guests,
a hunt, and many other activities as governed by complex social rules. In a
shockingly brutal scene, beaters drive a host of rabbits and pheasants out
of the woods to be shot down by the guests. The scene is bookended by
two exchanges. Before the serious killing begins, two minor characters
engage in a dialog of exaggerated civility:
La Bruyere: Forgive me, Saint-Aubin, I was a little taken aback
when I shot this pheasant. I thought it was coming over me, but
really it's yours, absolutely ...
Saint-Aubin: No, no. When I shot it, it was beyond the little pine
tree ...
La Bruyere: I assure you not, dear boy, it was yours.
Saint-Aubin: Oh! You are too kind!33
Once the shooting is over, the same characters again invoke the rules, this
time with childish anger:
Saint-Aubin: I say there, that pheasant, there, there, on the left ...
La Bruyere: Listen, Monsieur, this time it's mine, there can be no
doubt about it.
Saint-Aubin: Ah! No. This time, it's mine. You're not going to
poach every bird that comes over. The last time, you took one from
right under my very nose and I didn't say a word.34

31.
32.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 195.

33.

SCREENPLAY, supranote 10, at 86.

34.

Id. at 98.
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The film depicts a world that is fully governed by rules. The characters
know their social roles, never question the rules that govern those roles,
and generally adhere to them.
There are rules governing infidelity as well. Although infidelity is a
tolerated transgression, it is condoned only when done correctly. Early in
the film, as the guests are arriving at La Colinibre, an anonymous servant
is taken aback when she learns that Andr6 is to be seated to Christine's
right at the dinner table. "Oh! Well, she's wrong! I'm all for doing what I
35
want in life, but conventions are conventions!" Even downstairs it is
understood that infidelity is only to be tolerated when done correctly.
The rules that govern infidelity in the film can be divided into two broad
categories. The first comprises general rules that happen to also apply to
those engaging in infidelity. After Andr6 and Christine decide to run away
together, they find themselves disagreeing about whether they should wait
to tell Robert.
Andrd: I cannot after all run off with the wife of a gentleman who
is receiving me at his home. . . who calls me his friend . .. to
without at least giving him an
whom I give my hand ...
explanation.
Christine: But since we love each other, Andrd? ... What can it
matter?
36
Andr.: Christine ... there are certain rules, after all!
Though Andr6 is smitten with Christine, he remains a gentleman, and as
such cannot violate the rules of friendship or neglect his duties as a guest.
More significant for my purposes are the rules specific to infidelity,
which require discretion and detachment. The film depicts Robert and his
lover Genevieve as the consummate players of the game of infidelity.
Robert's affair with Genevieve predates his marriage to Christine. He has
never been a faithful husband. But he has kept the affair hidden from his
wife. Although Octave, Lisette and almost everyone else in the film knows
of it, Christine does not discover the affair until midway through the film,
when she spies Robert and Genevieve embracing. Nor do either Robert or
Genevieve seem especially motivated by love. After telling Christine that
he keeps no secrets from her, Robert is driven by guilt to break off the
affair with Genevieve. When he attempts to do so, Genevieve describes
her feelings toward him: "Believe me if you want to, Robert: I care for
you. I don't know if it's love or the result of habit, but if you left me, I
would be very unhappy and I do not want to be unhappy." Robert lamely
agrees to continue the affair, and Genevieve observes, "Oh well, it's a
good thing for me you're a weak man."" The relationship is one of

35.
36.
37.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 39.
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convenience, habit, and mutual benefit. The rules of infidelity require
dissimulation38 and detachment.3 9 So long as Robert and Genevieve
remain together, they understand and largely abide by them.
As I observed above, the film's plot is largely driven by violations of
those rules. Upstairs the most significant transgressions are Andr6's all too
public and passionate devotion to Christine, Octave's true love for
Christine, and Christine's own transparency, authenticity and emotional
involvement. Downstairs the plot is driven by Schumacher's inability to
understand the game of infidelity that his wife and Marceau the poacher
are playing. In all these instances, the dramatic tension comes not from the
cheating, but a failure to abide by the rules that govern cheating. The film
depicts a world in which some rules are expected to be followed and some
to be broken, and where rules of the latter type can be broken in the right
way or in the wrong way.
B. Rules ofEfficient Breach
Although rarely emphasized by its advocates, a fully articulated theory
of efficient breach tells a similar story about the law of contracts.
The economic and instrumentalist approach that supports efficient
breach does not entail that anything goes. The theory does not
countenance, for example, wrongs at the time of formation such as duress
and misrepresentation. Enforcing party choice advances welfare and
enhances autonomy only when that choice is voluntary and knowing.
Duress and misrepresentation are therefore transgressions that should not
be tolerated.
Nor does the efficient breach theory celebrate all instances of
nonperformance. The opportunistic breacher, who breaches only to take
advantage of the other side's vulnerability and transfer gains to herself,
does not increase the joint gains of trade but merely redistributes them. As
such, she is not playing by the rules of the efficient breach game. Thus,
Richard Posner recognized in the 1986 edition of his Economic Analysis of
Law that "[i]f a promisor breaks his promise merely to take advantage of
the vulnerability of the promisee ... we might as well throw the book at
[him]." 40 For the same reason, the theory supports a mandatory duty of

38. The social acceptability of lies appears in Robert and Christine's first scene together. After
Robert says he understands her relationship with Andr6, Christine thanks him, explaining, "A lie is a
very heavy garment to carry around." Robert is dismissive. "A lie, you exaggerate." Id. at 36. Such
dissimulation is a normal and accepted part of Robert's world.
39. A nice statement of the rule of detachment can be found in an exchange between Andr6 and
Octave on the latter's penchant for affairs with servants. Although Andr6 does not play by the rules
with Christine, as a member of the upper class he understands them. "But, old boy, despise them, take
their money and then, from time to time, give them a few good slaps, you'll see how they adore you.
But if you are unfortunate enough to show them that you love them .. . you're done for!" Id. at 88.
(The dialog can be heard on the complete soundtrack of the original film, but is not in the
reconstructed version.)
40. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 105 (3d ed., 1986).

2017]

Klass

89

good faith that fills the interstices of the parties' express agreement with a
generic requirement that they not take unbargained-for advantage of one
another.4 1 One party's willful attempt to exploit the other's
misunderstanding of their contract, for example, "has no social product,
and ... like theft it induces costly defensive expenditures, in the form of
overelaborate disclaimers or investigations into the trustworthiness of a
prospective contract partner, just as the prospect of theft induces
expenditures on locks." 42
In addition, and more significantly for my purposes, the principles that
support efficient breach also entail that there are right and wrong ways to
efficiently breach a contract. In order to explain why, it is necessary to go
a bit deeper into the efficient breach theory.
The argument for efficient breach turns on relative transaction costs.
Efficient nonperformance can result either from a unilateral decision,
made by one party acting in the shadow of the expectation remedy, or by a
negotiated release, in which both sides agree to discharge the contract in
the umbra of deterrence-based supercompensatory remedies or injunctive
relief.43 The question is which reaches that outcome at a lower cost,
thereby producing greater expected gains of trade for the parties to divide.
The argument for using expectation damages to incentivize efficient
breach is that when performance becomes inefficient, it is cheaper for one
party to decide to breach and pay damages than it is for two parties, who
are in a bilateral monopoly, to agree to an exit price.
Although the efficient breach argument turns on relative transaction
costs, efficient breach theorists have not had much to say about how the
law might reduce-or incentivize the parties to reduce-the costs of
efficient breach decisions." Two costs of efficient breach are especially
salient. The first is the cost to each party of knowing when breach is
efficient, which requires knowing inter alia how much the other side
stands to gain from performance. Richard Brooks has suggested that this
cost sometimes recommends restructuring the incentives to give the
unilateral performance decision to the party owed performance, rather than
the party owing it.4 5 The second is the cost of ensuring that a breaching
party pays the expectation damages she owes the nonbreaching party.
41. For an account of the duty of good faith along these lines, see Daniel Markovits, Good Faith
As Contract's Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW, supranote 5, at 272.

42.

Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner,

J.). Todd Rakoff argues that efficiency supports an even more robust duty of good faith, "imposing an
obligation on one party without regard to motive in order to facilitate the other party's knowing
performance." Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contact Performance: Market Street Associates

Partnership v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1196 (2007).

43. See Klass, supra note 25 at 372-73; see also Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and
Economic Rationality: The Geometry of ContractLaw, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49, 70; Alan Schwartz, The
Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
44. The discussion in the next few paragraphs draws on Gregory Klass, Contracting for

Cooperation in Recovery, 117 YALE L.J. 2 (2007).
45. Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient PerformanceHypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006).
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These costs depend in large part on the behavior of the party in breach.
They thereby provide markers of, in efficiency terms, right and wrong
ways to efficiently beach a contract.
Once a party has decided to efficiently breach, she has a choice. She
might volunteer to pay damages, or she might sit back and wait for the
nonbreaching party to sue. The first option reduces the costs of the
nonbreaching party's recovery; the second increases those costs. This is
not the only way a breaching party might affect the costs of recovery. If
breach is not easily observable, a breaching party can choose to inform the
other side of her breach, to remain silent about it, or she might attempt to
hide the breach. Before breach, a party might have a choice between
keeping records of her performance, not keeping such records, or
falsifying records. After breach, the breaching party might attempt to
prevent or delay a lawsuit by providing false assurances that performance
is forthcoming, or false certificates that performance has happened. A
party in breach might maintain funds to pay a judgment, or she might
manipulate her assets to make herself judgment proof. And a breaching
party can often choose between settlement and litigating a meritorious
claim against her.
In prior work I have called behavior that increases nonbreaching party's
costs of obtaining compensation "obstruction of recovery," as
distinguished from "cooperation in recovery." 46 Obstruction threatens the
efficiency of the expectation measure in two ways. First, it adds
transaction costs. Obstructive behavior increases the nonbreaching party's
costs of securing the recovery to which she is entitled and can itself be
costly to undertake. Because the efficient breach theory relies on a story
about relative transaction costs, it should not tolerate obstruction of
recovery. Second, a self-interested rational breaching party will choose
obstruction only when she expects it to reduce the chances that she will
have to pay for her breach. Obstruction therefore also threatens the
efficiency of the incentives that the expectation measure is supposed to
provide. Obstruction not only makes efficient breaches costly. It also
makes it less likely that a breach is efficient.
The efficient way to breach a contract is to inform the other side that
one will not be performing and volunteer to pay expectation damages. The
inefficient way to breach a contract is to hide the fact of breach, to refuse a
request for damages, to drag out litigation, or to otherwise obstruct
recovery. On the theory, efficient breaches of the first type should be
celebrated; efficient breaches of the second type condemned.

46.

Klass, supranote 44.
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C. FurtherParallels
Just as La Rfgle du Jeu depicts a society in which there is a right way
and a wrong way to engage in infidelity, a fully articulated theory of
efficient breach distinguishes between good and bad efficient breaches.
The rules that govern tolerable transgressions in the two stories are not the
same. The rules of infidelity, as depicted in the film, require discretion and
detachment. The rules of efficient beach require transparency and taking
responsibility. That said, the similarities between the two stories are more
than structural.
First, the fact that both stories identify correct and incorrect
transgressions makes room for an ethics, and even a morality, of
nominally transgressive behavior. Two examples from La Rfgle du Jeu
illustrate. In their first extended scene together, Octave is furious at Andr6
for having wronged Christine by announcing his love for her on the radio.
Octave: And you, instead of playing out your role of national hero,
calmly and modestly, start to shoot off for your listeners . . . well,
instead of that, you start telling them about Christine . .. whom
they've never heard of . .. about Christine, in public . . . just like
that. And after that, you're surprised that she shuts her door in your
face.
Andrd: But if I made this flight, if I crossed the Atlantic ... it was
because of her . .. only because of her, you understand. . . . It was
she who encouraged me. So when I saw that she wasn't even there
when I landed ...
Octave: You forget that she is a woman of the world ... and that
particular world, it has its rules-very stiff ones.47
Andr6 does not wrong Christine by pursuing her despite her marriage to
Robert, but by violating the rule of discretion. Later in the film it is Octave
who almost violates the rules by planning to run away with Christine
despite the fact that he is unable to financially support her. Now it is
Lisette who plays the moralist.
Lisette: You're wrong, Monsieur Octave!
Octave: (surprised) Why wrong?
Lisette: Because when it's a question of having fun, just that, it's
not important at all. But living together, the two of you . .. I think
one should leave the young with the young and the old with the
old! 48

Octave-himself something of a moralizer-realizes that his passion for
Christine is about to lead him to harm her, and so sends Andr6 to her in his
stead. Although the world depicted in La Rfgle du Jeu is not one of
conventional morality, it is neither immoral nor amoral. It is not immoral
47.
48.

SCREENPLAY, supranote 10, at 42.
SCREENPLAY, supra note 10, at 161.
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so long as everyone understands the nature of the game they are playing. It
is not amoral because within that game it remains possible to distinguish
behavior that is morally right from behavior that is morally wrong.
Along the same lines, the distinction between permissible and
impermissible efficient breaches allows Markovits and Schwartz to claim
that their theory describes a "commercial morality of the exchange
transaction." 49 As noted above, Markovits and Schwartz are of the view
that contractual commitments between sophisticated parties are
commitments not to perform, but to perform or pay damages. They
denominate the failure to either perform or pay a "true breach." A true
breach is the functional equivalent of what I have called obstruction of
recovery. Because true breach is never efficient, the theory of efficient
breach treats it as wrongful.
[W]hereas [first-generation economic] approaches assimilate
'efficient breach' to the absence of an obligation, we assimilate
'efficient breach' to an obligation's performance; and whereas
traditional economic theories of efficient breach understand the
expectation remedy as a mechanism for identifying cases in which
promisors are not obligated at all, we understand the expectation
remedy as a direct enforcement of promisor's contracts.'o
A party's failure to perform when performance is inefficient does not
wrong the other side. But her subsequent failure to pay damages, and even
more her actions calculated to avoid paying them, do. Because efficiency
and party choice identify correct and an incorrect ways to efficiently
breach a contract, the theory of efficient breach can also be a moral theory.
The second substantive similarity between the moral universes of La
Rgle du Jeu and the theory of efficient breach concerns the response to
such wrongs. In both stories, "true breaches" should not be priced, but
punished. The punishment in La Rgle du Jeu is banishment from the
society of La Colinibre."' After the chase through the house, Robert
dismisses both Schumacher and Marceau. Schumacher's unwillingness to
tolerate his wife's affair with Marceau means that he cannot function
within that society. Marceau has not violated those rules. He is something
of an innocent victim in the whole affair. But as Robert apologetically and
with some irony explains, "It is difficult for me to throw Schumacher out
and to leave you here with his wife. I'm sure you understand that would be
immoral."52 Andr6, who has allowed himself to fall in love with Christine,
is shot and killed in a case of mistaken identity. He too, in the end, leaves
the society of La Colinibre.ss Finally, in the penultimate scene Octave sets
49.

Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 27 at 1943.

50.

Id. at 1986.

51. See SESONSKE, supra note 11, at 410 (noting at the end of the film three interlopers are
expelled: Octave, Andr6 and Marceau).
52. SCREENPLAY, supranote 10, at 147.
53. Sesonki makes a similar point about the meaning of Andr6's death:
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off on foot to the train station, telling Marceau from now on he must "try
to manage on my own" in Paris.54 In the end, all the men who have been
involved in serious violations are forced to leave La Colinibre. The social
world depicted in the film can tolerate the transgression of infidelity. But
it cannot tolerate those who violate the rules that govern infidelity.
In a fully articulated theory of efficient breach, the same holds true for
obstruction of recovery. Because obstruction, or "true breach" in
Markovits and Schwartz's idiom, is never efficient,s the theory
recommends penalizing it, deterring it tout court, rather than pricing it.
Thus in Markovits and Schartz's account, the nonperforming party is not
given the option of true breach. "[T]he expectation remedy is specific
performance of the promise to transfer."5 6 I have argued that on the model
specific performance of the payment term might be too weak a sanction.
does not penalize the initial nonconsensual
Injunctive relief ...
taking. Instead, an injunction clarifies what the entitlement is and
establishes that any future nonconsensual taking of it will be
penalized by civil or criminal contempt. Why should contract law
give the promisor who has refused to act or transfer a do-over? The
theory supports awarding punitive damages to the promisee who
has been forced to go to court to vindicate her entitlement to
performance of the disjunctive obligation.57
The efficient breach theory supports supercompensatory remedies such as
punitive damages or disgorgement-certainly for actively obstructing the
recovery of damages, and perhaps also for passively declining to pay
them. Markovits and Schwartz agree in principle, but argue that specific
performance is preferable in light of "pragmatic difficulties that are
internal to the effective articulation and administration of a punitive
regime." Whether these pragmatic difficulties are insurmountable is an
empirical question. The important point is that according to the efficient
breach theory, failures to abide by the rules of efficient breach should be
met with penalties rather than prices.

If we have attended to the rules of the killing game, it may appear that the death of Andr6
Jurieu occurs quite in accord with the etiquette of la chasse. As a utilitarian act, clearing the
master's domain of one more invading rabbit, it falls quite properly to a servant, and quite
precisely to Schumacher. But if, as Renoir says, it is also a sacrifice on the alter of God so
that the bourgeois life may continue for a while, then Robert, the master, must authenticate
the rite-as he does by proclaiming the death an accident. Hence, perhaps, the propriety, in
this bourgeois world, of the general's final verdict on the deed: "No, no, no, no, no. This La
Chesnaye does not lack class."
SESONSKE, supra note 11, at 400.
54. SCREENPLAY, supranote 10, at 166.
55. Klass, supra note 44 at 56 ("Obstructive breach is rarely efficient."); Markovits & Schwartz,
supra note 27, at 1949 ("no true breach is efficient").
56. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1987.
57. Klass, supra note 28, at 149; see also Klass, supra note 44, at 54-60 (arguing that punitive
damages are often the appropriate response to obstruction).
58. Markovits & Schwartz, supranote 27, at 1990.
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Efficient breach theorists rarely emphasize this result. But it should not
surprise. In the language of Calabresi and Malamed, the efficient breach
story characterizes the entitlement to contract performance as protected by
a liability rule. 9 Expectation damages give parties the option to perform
or pay. But a legal system cannot operate with liability rules all the way
down.o The entitlement holder's right to payment for the taking must
eventually be protected by a property rule. Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus
make a similar point with respect to liability rules in tort law.
Despite having a system of injunctions and tort-like remedies to
enforce certain claims, an enjoined party liable in torts might
refuse to pay damages. A criminal law might then be necessary to
enforce compliance. In this sense the criminal law is always in the
background of the transaction structure, supporting the whole. The
criminal law, or some institutional arrangement very much like it,
is therefore necessary to enforce the primary means of institutional
relief. 61
No matter how permissive a social norm is, if there is a norm-if there
remain rules to the game-it must be possible to identify interpersonal
assessments of when the norm is violated and the application of some
negative sanction for such violations.62 In La R~gle du Jeu, failures to
adhere to the rules of infidelity result in expulsion from the society in
which the game is played. On the theory of efficient breach, the
nonbreaching party's entitlement to damages should be protected by a
property rule, which is to say that obstructive behavior should not be
priced but punished.
Although a fully elaborated theory of efficient breach supports
penalizing both opportunistic breaches and obstruction of recovery, the
stories that efficient breach theorists tell typically involve neither.
Efficient breach theorists tell stories about efficient breaches. That choice
is understandable. On the theory, efficient breaches both explain the law's
attachment to the expectation measure and generate the surprise ending
that makes the theory interesting: the law is structured to sometimes
encourage breach. But that focus has also contributed to popular confusion

59.

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:

One View ofthe Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
60. For some attempts to go as far as possible with multiple layers of liability rules, see IAN
AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005); and Ian Ayres & Jack M.
Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J.

703 (1996).
61. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335,
1336 (1986); see also Alan K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, 27 NOMOS: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 289 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1985) (arguing that liability rules establish transactions
structures that are enforced by the criminal law).
62. For the same point at a much higher level of abstraction, see ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING
IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING AND DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT 32-36, 42-46 (1998)
(describing the conditions of normativity as including the practical normative attitude of assessment
and the ability to identify sanctions for violations).
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about just what the theory does and does not say. I know of no systematic
study of judicial application of the theory of efficient breach. But two
examples suggest that courts do not always appreciate its nuances.
US ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans concerned
Countrywide Home Loan's knowing and undisclosed delivery to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac of billions of dollars in bundled nonverified
subprime loans, despite the company's promise to provide only
"investment quality mortgages."63 On appeal, the Second Circuit
overturned a jury finding of fraud. The court's reasoning as a whole did
not rely on the theory of efficient breach. Yet in explaining why the $1.27
billion penalty was inappropriate, the Second Circuit appealed to "the
common law's tolerance for, even encouragement of, so-called 'efficient
breaches' that increase overall wealth."" This is extremely odd.
Countrywide's breach was anything but efficient. The practice of granting
sub-prime mortgages to unqualified borrowers, then bundling and selling
them off to unsuspecting investors did not create new value. In fact, the
widespread practice almost triggered a collapse of the national economy.
Given the opportunistic nature of Countrywide's breach and its massive
negative externalities, the mere mention of the theory suggests a basic
confusion about what behavior the theory tolerates and what behavior it
would punish.
Even more problematic is the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in United
States v. Blankenship, an appeal from a criminal fraud conviction
65
stemming from a government contract with a minority-owned business.
The court explained as follows why the business owner's contractual
promises to do work that he intended to give to someone else could not
possibly be false:
A contract is a document that serves only to establish a legal
relationship between two parties; it gives each party nothing more
than a legal expectancy in having the other party either perform or
(generally) respond in damages. It is not illegal for a party to
breach a contract; a contract gives a party two equally viable
options (perform or pay compensation), between which it is
generally at liberty to choose. A "promise" contained in a contract
is not a certification that the promisor will actually perform the
specified acts, or presently intends to perform those acts, but is
instead a grant of a legal right to the other party to either enjoy
performance or receive damages. Indeed, the whole notion of

63. US ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 2016 WL 2956743, Nos. 15-496, 15499 (2d Cir., May 23, 2016).
64. Id., slip op. at 20 (citing Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Friendly, J.).
65. United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2004).
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"efficient breach" is that a party should abrogate its contractual
responsibilities if a more profitable opportunity comes along.66
This reasoning is deeply confused. The theory of efficient breach in no
way recommends doing away with the doctrine of promissory fraud ("a
certification . . . that the promisor ... presently intends to perform"). 67 A
promise that the promisor intends to breach from the outset does not create
social value, but merely results in a damage payment from one side to the
other. Neither efficiency nor morality supports tolerating such bad
behavior.
Two judicial opinions do not demonstrate pervasive confusion about the
theory of efficient breach. And some judges get the theory right.68 But the
examples, both from US Courts of Appeals, illustrate the worry. Some
wrongs between even sophisticated contracting parties can be punished
without sacrificing either efficiency or morality. And the thinking in these
cases is consistent with more general features of our law of contracts.
Although courts have dabbled with punitive damages for post-breach
obstruction, most famously in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v.
Standard Oil Co.,69 those experiments have been largely abandoned. 70 And
though some forms of obstruction satisfy the elements of the tort of deceit,
many courts apply the economic loss rule to bar such claims between
contracting parties. Other than generic rules against obstructive behavior
during litigation, such as Rule 37's provision of sanctions for the failure to
cooperate in discovery,7 perhaps the only clear example in US law of a
punitive response to obstructive breach is the False Claims Act, which
imposes treble damages and per-claim fines on government contractors
who submit false invoices.73 That rule, however, applies only to
government contracts.
In short, the story of efficient breach that gets told and retold in popular
legal culture simplifies too much. Just as infidelity in La R~gle du Jeu
remains highly regulated, so too a commitment to efficiency should
distinguish between good and bad breaches. A more complete theory of
efficient breach includes stories about opportunistic breaches and
obstruction of recovery. Thinking about the correct legal response to
breaches of these types reveals a degree of correspondence between
efficiency and morality, just as the film depicts an internal morality of
66.

Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1133-34 (internal citations omitted).

67. For more on this topic, see IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW
OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 59-82, 90-99 (2005).

68. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F. 2d 742, 751-52 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner,
J.); Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 683-84 (Cal. 1995) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
69. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
70.
71.

See id. (overruling Seaman's).
See Klass, supra note 44, at 41-49.

72.

FED. R. Clv. P. 37.

73. I explore the workings of the False Claims Act in Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied
Certificationunder the False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (2011).
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infidelity. As it is, common misunderstandings about the efficient breach
theory's scope can, even in cases involving sophisticated parties, lead to
outcomes that are both inefficient and morally unsatisfying.
IV. THE MORAL VALUE OF THE GAME

Up to this point, I have described the plot and structure of La R~gle du
Jeu largely from the perspective of members of the society the film
depicts-from the internal point of view of a competent player of the
game of infidelity. From that perspective, behavior that conventional
morality marks as a wrong is in fact permissible, but only when done in
the right way. This is the internal morality of infidelity in the film, or the
rules of that game.
La R~gle du Jeu is not, however, a morality play about the right and
wrong ways to commit adultery. Renoir does not adopt the perspective of
his characters or the society they inhabit. He is a social critic, and the film
suggests that the social world it depicts is not a healthy one. The diseases
are manifold. Here I focus on two. Each points the way toward a more
sophisticated moral criticism of the theory of efficient breach.
A. The Value of the Practice
The first moral criticism concerns the conditions for human flourishing
and is illustrated by the character of Robert de la Chesnaye. Robert has
completely internalized the rules of his social station. As the cook
marvels, he is the sort of gentleman who can tell right away when the
potatoes in the salad were not properly doused with white wine after
boiling. Robert is the consummate host, who after an evening of chaos and
gunshots puts his guests at ease on their way to bed with a few fabrications
and gentle reassurances. And he understands the rules and plays the game
of infidelity better than anyone. He is both an attentive husband to
Christine and, when the film begins, a reliable inamorato to Genevibve.
And he remains a generous and gregarious friend to Andr6, despite
Andr6's public affair with Robert's wife. As the General puts it in the
film's last line, "La Chesnaye does not lack class."7 4
But Robert is also a pitiable figure. In his first scene, he demonstrates to
Christine his newly acquired "little romantic Negress"-a music box with
a mechanical depiction of a black woman. Robert is a collector of
mechanical musical figures, which are the object of his devotion. At La
Coliniere, he shows off to his guests his greatest acquisition, a large
calliope, "the culmination of my career as a collector of musical and
mechanical instruments."75 In what Renoir described as "the best shot I've
74. SCREENPLAY, supranote 10, at 168.
75. Id. at 133. Reinoir later said that this scene "provides the clearest explanation of the character
of La Chesnaye." Interview in Sologne (with Office de radiodiffusion-telivision frangaise), reprinted
in SCREENPLAY, supra note 10, at 9, 12.

98

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 29:1

done in my life," the camera pans across three mechanical men and then
onto Robert's face, which expresses a "mixture of humility and pride, of
success and doubt."76 Robert prefers the simulacrum of life to the real
thing and is as hollow as the mechanical toys he cares so much for. He
does not live an authentic life, but plays at life according to the rules of the
society he occupies.
The depiction of Robert is but one charge in the film's general
indictment of the social order he epitomizes. I am not the first to note
Renoir's critical attitude. Leo Braudy writes: "La R~gle du Jeu embodies a
social world in which there are rules but no values. If you don't know the
rules, you are crushed; but if you do know the rules, you are cut off from
your own nature." 77 So too Alexander Sesonske, who describes SaintAubin and La Bruyere's petty arguments about the rules of the hunt as
follows:
In a field strewn with slaughtered game, they heatedly dispute the
etiquette of the hunt-the living game means nothing if the rules
of the game are breached. These exchanges show perhaps how
thin the veneer of civility is; within the double brackets Renoir
displays the savagery that smolders underneath.7 8
The guests at La Coliniere are in turn clueless, hapless, petty, cruel,
foppish, childish, needy, and absurd-epitomized by Madame La Bruyere,
who explains to a servant that she takes salt in her food, "but only sea salt,
and added only after cooking." 79 It is a decadent society. At the beginning
of the film, Christine exclaims, "Oh well, what is natural nowadays."8 0
Renoir's message is that nothing in the society he depicts is the least bit
natural or healthy.
The general indictment applies also to the game of infidelity. The game
is unnatural. Its rules of detachment and discretion do not allow for
genuine human relationships. This is demonstrated inter alia by
Christine's impact on the men around her. An Austrian, Christine does not
belong to Parisian high society.8 ' Her presence is disruptive because, in
distinction to those around her, she seeks authentic relationships. She
shows Andr6, Robert and Octave an alternative, more natural, and more
attractive form of romantic love than their society offers, causing each to
act in ways that upsets the equilibrium that the rules of infidelity otherwise
maintain. Andr6 falls too deeply in love; Robert attempts to break off his
affair with Genevieve; Octavio nearly betrays his friendships with both
76.
77.
78.
79.

Interview, supra note 75, at 12.
LEO BRAUDY, JEAN RENOIR: THE WORLD OF His FiLMS 132 (1972).
SESONSKE, supra note 11, at 398.
SCREENPLAY, supra note 10, at 66.

80.

Id. at 31.

81. Saint-Aubin: "Poor Christine, I feel sorry for her, because she is a foreigner." Id. at 37.
Octave: "after all, the girl's not at home, she's in a foreign country; the people around her don't speak
her language." Id. at 41. Christine's father was a great Viennese conductor, whereas her husband
collects mechanized musical instruments.
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Andr6 and Robert. All are moved by the possibility of a love that is more
82
human than "an exchange of whims and the contact of skins," which is
all the game of infidelity can provide.
One can imagine a similar charge against the theory of efficient breach.
The choice-based theory of efficient breach argues that naYve moral
criticisms misunderstand the game sophisticated parties are playing.
Sophisticated parties are contracting for efficient breaches. So long as
damages are paid, an efficient breach is not a broken promise. It is not a
"true breach." Faced with this response, the moral critic might ask instead
about the relationships such promises underwrite. Do the attitudes, acts
and commitments that the theory of efficient breach recommends compose
an attractive picture of moral character and human relations? Like the
game of infidelity in La R~gle du Jeu, perhaps the game of efficient breach
is itself morally problematic. Perhaps it envisions a form of interaction
that does not allow for human flourishing. Perhaps those who take the
theory of efficient breach to heart will find themselves treating others as
means rather than ends and in a way that undermines the development of
more authentic or valuable forms of sociability.83
Joseph Raz has suggested that if we want to understand the moral
obligation to keep a promise we should begin with an account of why the
84
abilities to make and to accept promises are morally valuable. Along
these lines, Seana Shiffrin has argued that promises are necessary for
maintaining the intimate relationships essential to a full moral life." When
two friends attach different values to some shared project, the one who
cares more can be left vulnerable. The other side's promise to participate
addresses that vulnerability by giving the insecure party the power to
demand performance and affirming the value of her preferences and
judgments. 86 David Owens has identified a somewhat different moral
82.
83.

Id. at 37-38. See supranote 12.
For additional thinking along these lines, see Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach,

45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 777, 791-97 (2012); and Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 29, at 740-49.
84.

See Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN

HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 228 (P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz eds., 1977) ("[Promise] principles

can only be justified if the creation of such special relationships between people is held to be
valuable.").
85. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL.

REV. 481 (2008).
86. Shiffrin illustrates with the following example: Suppose, A and B are together engaging in
some project, such as moving to a new city, and that A has a greater interest in its success than does B.
This difference can cause A to be vulnerable to B, and that vulnerability can degrade their relationship.
B's ability to commit to the project with a promise prevents such degradation.

rp

conveys B's willingness to forswear the moral right to alter course. B's
Promising to
participation is no longer dependent on how B perceives the merits of the activity at the time
of action. The promise acknowledges A's investment in the situation in a way that includes
A rather than making A a bystander to what unfolds... The promise to A does not just
increase the likelihood of B's performance (if it does so at all) but actively affirms A's
status as a free person, capable and worthy of exercising sound judgment about what is to be
done. B's relinquishment and transfer of that power to A works to neutralize aspects of the
situation's hazards and to restore an equal standing between A and B in this local domain.
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interest promising serves, which he calls the "authority interest."87 Owens
argues that humans have an interest in being able to control the "normative
landscape"-in being able to shape their own rights and obligations and
those of people around them.88 Like Shiffrin, Owens explains the value of
promises by looking to the challenges of acting together. But whereas
Shiffrin emphasizes the quality of the relationship, Owens focuses on the
promisee's interest in being able to decide whether performance is
required. 89 A promise, as Owens emphasizes, gives the promisee a new
normative power: to determine whether or not the promisor has a moral
duty to perform. In doing so, it expands the promisee's autonomy and
serves her moral interests.
These are only two possible accounts of the value of being able to make
morally binding promises. But either could be used to make a case for the
moral deficits of the obligations that the choice-based efficient breach
theory imagines. A promisor who undertakes a duty only to perform or
pay damages retains a degree of discretion that leaves the promisee
vulnerable. The promisee can no longer count on performance, and
therefore remains at the promisor's mercy. As Shiffrin writes, such a
promisor "has usurped [the promisee's] ability to make independent,
voluntary decisions about the use and form of [the promisee's] time,
attention and labor." 90 Nor does an efficient breach promisor grant the
promisee the degree of authority over her that Owens finds valuable. The
recipient of an efficient-breach promise cannot determine whether the
promisor is obligated to perform, but can absolve her only from the
obligation to pay damages. Even if a promise to perform or pay is still a
promise, the content of that promise tends to undermine, rather than foster,
the values promising serves.
Shiffrin's and Owens's accounts of the moral value of the practice of
promising suggest why one might find the content of efficient breach
promises morally problematic. If such commitments erode rather than
support the special relationships and autonomy interests that the practice
of promising underwrites, perhaps we should worry about the moral
culture they create. A promise to perform or pay damages, no matter what

Id. at 507-08.
87. David Owens, A Simple Theory ofPromising, 115 PHIL. REV. 59 (2006).
88.

Owens further develops these ideas in DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE

143-53 (2012).
89.

Or as Owens writes:

[S]omeone motivated to insist on the right to decide for themselves what they are going to
do will also be motivated to seek the right to require another to behave in a certain way,
where their own decisions depend on the actions of that other person. And, in return for
receiving this right, they may be willing to sacrifice their own freedom of action in some
matter of less importance to themselves. A promise effects such grants of authority.
Owens, supranote 87, at 70.
90. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551,

1564 (2008).
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its price effect and no matter what the promisee's preferences, expresses
an attitude towards the promisee at odds with a healthy moral relationship.
Although I believe such practice-based moral criticisms avoid the
pitfalls of the naive moral objection to efficient breach, I do not think they
are decisive. The above arguments, or something like them, might show
that a promise to perform or pay would be inappropriate, and even
harmful, among friends or other intimates. But not everyone is, or should
be, my friend. Human sociability is multilayered, and valuable
relationships take many forms.
Daniel Markovits, for example, has argued that contractual
commitments underwrite a distinctive form of sociability, one that
"replaces a concern for other persons' interests-the concern that
underwrites the sharing of ends involved in typical personal promiseswith a concern for other persons' intentions and, ultimately, for their
points of view."9 1 Parties to a contract do not bind themselves to one
another, but to the project to which they have agreed. They undertake to
collaborate on that project, but not necessarily to cooperate with one
another in it, where "cooperation" is understood to involve commitment to
broader shared purposes or reciprocal care. A promise to perform or pay
damages does not undermine this relatively thin form of sociability.
Although the efficient breach promisor does not grant the promisee the
type of authority that Shiffrin or Owens describes, she does commit
herself to the project that the parties have together chosen. And though
this might mean that the parties are not interacting as friends or intimates,
it does not follow that their relationship has no value. On the contrary, the
joint commitment to the project involves its own form of mutual respect
and even solidarity. It is not friendship, but a form of sociability that has a
value of its own.
It would be odd to claim that La Rgle du Jeu perfectly captures
everything one might say about the theory of efficient breach. But
Renoir's story is rich enough that one can find in it an analog to the above
defense of efficient breach promises. After Christine runs off with SaintAubin, Robert and Andr6 engage in a fistfight over her. When the fight is
interrupted by a gunshot from Schumacher, the two immediately begin
working together, initially to control the drunkenly manic Genevieve and
then to hide the debacle from the other guests. Soon they are acting like
friends, each complimenting the other on his fighting abilities and then
discussing the practical details of Andr6's departure with Christine
because, as Robert explains, "I love her so much. . . that I want her to
leave with you." 92 Robert and Andr6 are of the same social set-Robert is
pleased that Christine "has picked someone from our milieu."93 Perhaps
91.

Daniel Markovits, Contractand Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1451 (2004).

92.

SCREENPLAY, supranote 10, at 148.
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the rules of infidelity will prevent either from ever having a genuine
loving relationship with Christine. But their mutual understanding of the
rules of their social class, including the need for emotional distance and
dissimulation, forms the basis of a mutual respect and a type of friendship
between them. Although Robert believes he has lost his wife to Andr6, he
apparently does not believe that Andr6 has wronged him. If in the social
world of La Colinibre authentic love is undermined by a practice of
infidelity, other forms of sociability remain possible. Those other forms
might even be enabled by the rules that thwart romantic love.
Is the friendship between Robert and Andr6 one we should value?
Should we value the uncaring but respectful collaborative relationships
that correspond to a promise to perform or pay damages? Such questions
cannot be answered in the abstract. More convincing than any argument
from first principles will be stories about the sort of sociability at issue.
Patricia Williams has powerfully described the value that, as a black
woman, she finds in legally structured relationships. She explains her
preference for a formal legal relationship with her landlord as follows:
I ... was raised to be acutely conscious of the likelihood that, no
matter what degree of professional or professor I became, people
would greet and dismiss my black femaleness as unreliable,
untrustworthy, hostile, angry, powerless, irrational, and probably
destitute. Futility and despair are very real parts of my response.
Therefore it is helpful for me, even essential for me, to clarify
boundary; to show that I can speak the language of lease is my way
of enhancing trust in me and my business affairs. 94
Williams's scholarship illustrates the power of such stories to reshape how
some might think about the meaning of one or another type of social
relationship. Whereas the friendship between Robert and Andre relies on
their shared membership in the upper class, contractual relationships
reflect the formal equality of the market. Williams suggests that the distant
but respectful relationships of formal contracting, in which one relies not
on the other party's character but on the content of her obligations, can be
empowering, as it presupposes each party's independence and selfsufficiency. If the theory of efficient breach does not demand the sort of
commitment that underwrites intimate relationships, its emphasis on
autonomy and self-sufficiency also signals a type of respect. That respect
is valuable in general and sometimes especially to members of otherwise
disadvantaged or marginalized groups.
The meaning and moral worth of any social practice depends on the
social context in which it occurs. One final example, which brings us back
to Renoir, can be found in Praveen Krishna's helpfully titled short story,

94. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdeals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
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Efficient Breaches: A Romance.95 Krishna tells of a couple in an arranged
marriage who, through extramarital affairs, discover otherwise impossible
forms of shared intimacy with one another. Whereas the game of infidelity
in La R~gle du Jeu alienates the characters from their natural selves,
discrete and detached adultery plays a positive role in Krisha's story. It
ends as follows:
As Sunita recounted this anecdote, recounted to her by a man who
was recounting it to himself, Narayan suddenly understood that
what he was hearing was not simply an anecdote, but a confession.
Or a boast. The lightness in her voice, the enthusiasm, the
nerves-whoever had told her this story was someone she was
sleeping with.
He would have never expected it of her. He was proud of his wife.
He hoped she did not feel guilty; he would have never wanted that
for her. He wanted to talk about it with her, to give her advice, but
she wouldn't have liked that. He had to be quiet for her just as,
after dinner, in bed, when Sunita whispered to him new things to
try, Narayan pretended to be ignorant.96
Both the value and the effects of a social practice commonly depend on
the broader social context in which it occurs. This holds equally for the
attitudes fostered by a promise to perform or pay damages.
The above observations are not a complete defense of the theory of
efficient breach from the practice-based moral criticism. But I think they
are enough to show that the criticism must do more than appeal to a
general theory of promising. Another way of putting the point is that it is
wrong to conflate contractual commitments with other sorts of agreementbased or promissory obligations, or to assume that they serve the same
values.97 A practice-based moral criticism of the theory of efficient breach
requires an account of why the attitudes and relationships that the theory
depicts are, in the contexts in which they occur, themselves morally
problematic. It is not enough to demonstrate that they do not correspond to
other morally valuable attitudes and relationships.
B. Effects on Nonplayers
There is, however, a second possible moral criticism of the choice-based
theory of efficient breach. This one emphasizes the theory's narrative
power and its potential effects on transactions that do not fit its model, and
especially on parties who do not conform to its expectations. This worry
too has its counterpart in La R~gle du Jeu: the practice of infidelity's
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effect on those who do not participate in it, whether because they do not
understand its rules or because they seek a different form of relationship.
Consider Schumacher, the Austrian gamekeeper. In most of the film,
Schumacher's rigid conventionalism and Teutonic rule worship serve as
comic fodder. But the last fifteen minutes show another side of his
character. After Marceau is ejected from the house, he happens upon
Schumacher standing alone by a stream. The poacher begins to sneak by,
but sees that Schumacher is quietly crying to himself. In a close-up, the
audience sees the tears streaming down Schumacher's face and Marceau's
sudden sympathy. The two sit together and discuss what each will do next.
Schumacher will stay in the area, near his wife whom he still loves.
Lisette, who plays the game of infidelity with gusto, has treated
Schumacher with nothing but contempt. Early in the film, the audience is
invited to share in that attitude. Now Schumacher's grief and resolve cast
Lisette's disregard in a new light. Her lighthearted, flirtatious fun and
attachment to Paris and to her employer's values have led Lissette to
mistreat Schumacher, who nonetheless remains deeply in love with her.
Schumacher now appears a noble character, whom Lisette has wronged.
The moral defect here is not so much the game itself, as the fact that it
being played with a person who does not understand its rules or wish to
play it. Sesonske, emphasizing Gaston Modot's performance as
Schumacher, suggests a similar reading:
As Schumacher he is flawless, an upright servant with pride in his
profession, a man of principle, baffled and outraged by a world
from which principles have disappeared-comic, tragic, ludicrous,
pitiful-the major symbol in La R~gle du Jeu of the impact of the
haut bourgeois style on traditional mores. 98
Schumacher, in the end, is a tragic figure. The fault lies neither in his stars
nor in himself, but in his dislocation to a society where he does not belong.
The tragedy of Schumacher reflects the tragedy of Christine. After she
spies Robert kissing Genevieve, Christine realizes that "[flor three years
my life has been based on a lie." 99 She decides to give up on authentic
friendship or love, and inexpertly throws herself into game of infidelity.
That evening she woos Saint-Aubin-a cynic, an ass, and a character
Christine could never love. Her pursuit of Saint-Aubin, together with
Schumacher's discovery of Marceau and Lisette, set into motion the
evening of mayhem that ends with Andr6's death, for which Christine
must hold herself responsible. In short, no matter what the inherent
morality or immorality of the game of infidelity, it presupposes that
everyone involved plays by its rules. When nonplayers are caught up in it,
they are likely to be harmed and to cause harm.
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One might similarly worry about the tendency of the theory of efficient
breach to escape its proper bounds. Early versions of the theory aimed to
explain contract law's generic preference for the expectation remedy.
They were theories of contract law as a whole. Later iterations
acknowledge the theory's assumptions, which include sophisticated
parties, competitive markets, cheap adjudication and high costs of
negotiating a release. But when a theory tells a simple, compelling story it
is easy to forget its premises. There is a long tradition in Anglo-American
contract law of idealizing agreement and ignoring the conditions in which
agreement occurs. The efficient breach story employs familiar characters:
independent and autonomous parties who are self-reliant, competent,
knowledgeable and rational. Because the theory fits so easily into broader
narrative about contract law, its rhetorical power and practical influence
can extend beyond the reach of its assumptions.
I have already discussed one way simple stories of efficient breach can
mislead. When courts appeal to the theory, they often ignore both the
difference between efficient breach and opportunistic breaches, and the
fact that it is not efficient to obstruct recovery. Even more troubling is the
extension of theory to contracts involving parties who might not
understand, appreciate or wish to be governed by its rules.
As choice-based efficient breach theories use the term, "sophisticated
parties" refers to risk-neutral, fully informed, perfectly rational, selfinterested profit maximizers. If any legal personality approximates this
description, it is perhaps the publicly traded corporation, in which
ownership is divested from control, and control is given to a collection of
highly trained managers who are tasked with one goal: maximizing
shareholder profit. Many contracting parties are not sophisticated in this
sense. When the efficient breach theory's recommended rules or attitudes
are applied or adopted beyond the range of the theory's assumptions, it is
much less likely to produce a morally adequate account of the transaction.
Although Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Company antedates
the efficient breach theory by a decade, its familiar facts nicely illustrate
the danger."oo In 1954, Willie and Lucille Peevyhouse leased their farm to
Garland Coal & Mining for strip mining. In addition to the payment of
royalties, Garland Coal agreed that, at the end of the lease, it would repair
the farm to "provide access to a small amount of land north of the pit,
assure its future utility as pasture land, and enhance the safety of persons
and livestock when near the pit.""0 ' Although not mentioned in the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion, the Peevyhouses waived a $3,000
102
Garland
up-front cash payment in return for that promise to remediate.
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Coal extracted very little coal from the Peevyhouse farm, but diverted a
creek onto it in order to mine elsewhere. At the end of its operations,
Garland Coal failed to perform the promised remediation. The question
before the court was the proper measure of damages where the evidence
suggested that the cost to remediate the land would be $29,000, and that
remediation would add only $300 to the farm's market value. The court
held that because the promise to remediate was "incidental" to the lease
and the market value of the work was grossly disproportionate to the cost
of performing it, the Peevyhouses could recover only the $300 diminution
in value.
There are many things to criticize in the Peevyhouse decision, including,
as the dissent pointed out, the majority's failure to recognize the
importance of the remediation term, which the Peevyhouses had insisted
on; Garland Coal's lack of excuse for its nonperformance, as it could have
predicted the costs of remediation both at the time of contracting and when
it decided to divert the creek; and the subjective value the Peevyhouses
attached to their farm, which monetized must have been at least $3,000.103
Here I want to focus on something else: the possible gap between the
Peevyhouses' and Garland Coal's attitudes toward contract performance.
We do not know, but it is easy to imagine that the Peevyhouses did not
think they were granting Garland Coal an option to perform or pay
damages-in any amount. Their benefit from the lease was contingent on
the quantity of coal Garland took out of their land. What would remain at
the end of the lease was their farm, which they would continue to occupy.
In an interview years later, Willie Peevyhouse "explained his view that it
was not right to take money for land and allow work to be done on it that
would make the land worthless in the future." 1' This is not to say that the
Peevyhouses expected Garland Coal to treat them as friends. But it
suggests that they believed they were receiving a commitment to perform,
not to perform or pay damages.
We also do not know with certainty what Garland Coal's expectation or
attitude was when it entered into the lease. But the company presumably
knew the risk that it would be difficult to mine the coal on the land. And
the record suggests that the only thing of substance that changed between
Garland Coal's agreement to remediate and its choice to breach was the
company's own decision to divert the creek onto the Peevyhouses'
property. It is easy to imagine that Garland Coal believed that it was not
committing to remediate, but only to remediate or pay damages.
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal is a wonderful teaching case in part
because it illustrates what can happen when parties have different
understandings of the rules of the game. One might say that if the
Peevyhouses had simply hired a lawyer, all this could have been avoided.
103.
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A good lawyer would have determined what her clients wanted from the
transaction and sought to structure it accordingly. A lawyer might, for
example, have suggested liquidating damages for breach of the duty to
remediate, or the use of a performance bond. That answer, however,
misses an equally important point. Parties contract for more than legal
obligations. They enter exchanges with expectations about one another's
attitudes towards performance. Those attitudes are material because they
inform and influence each party's behavior under the contract."o' If the
Peevyhouses believed that Garland Coal had an unconditional obligation
to remediate, whereas Garland Coal viewed nonperformance as a
permissible option, then something went wrong in their transaction. What
was wrong, however, is not something that that the theory of efficient
breach can comprehend. It lies outside of that theory's assumptions.
The above account of Peeveyhouse goes beyond what we know about
the facts of the case. But one cannot understand the canonical contracts
teaching cases without adopting hypotheses about what was really going
on, both between the parties and on the bench. An appropriately critical
understanding of the law requires thinking about both the stories that
judicial opinions tell, and those they might choose not to tell. And as I
have been at pains to emphasize, the theory of efficient breach also tells a
story about who the parties are, what they want from their exchange
transactions, and how the law figures into their attitudes and actions. The
critical question about all such stories is whether they capture the salient
facts. Peeveyhouse v. GarlandCoal is a classic case because there's such a
strong intuition that the majority missed something important in reaching
its decision.
The issue is a general one. The law of contract applies to everything
from an uncle's promise to give his nephew $5,000 to refrain from
drinking, smoking and gambling to a multi-million dollar long-term
supply contract between two corporations. Theories of contract law,
including theories that focus on contract remedies, tend to reach equally
broadly. The danger in both law and theory is that the search for general
rules or principles will cause us to neglect features of transactions that
should figure into the legal outcome. The way for lawmakers to avoid that
danger is to tailor rules based on who the parties are, on the relationship
between them, and on the type of transaction they are entering into. This is
why we have employment law, consumer law, a law for the sale of goods,
06
securities law, a law of prenuptial agreements, and so forth.1 The way for
theoreticians to avoid the danger of overgeneralization is to constantly
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keep the assumptions of the theory in mind, and to test them against the
facts of the transactions that contract law governs.
Even sophisticated players might sometimes want more than a
commitment to perform or pay. The Supreme Court's 2015 decision in
Kansas v. Nebraska gets this right, though it comes out exactly the
opposite way that the theory of efficient breach says it should. The case
concerned a special master's award of disgorgement for breach of an
interstate water compact. The disgorgement measure required Nebraska to
pay not the value of Kansas's loss, but the profits Nebraska realized as a
result of its breach.' 07 Justice Kagan's opinion all but says that Nebraska's
breach was efficient. The special master had "concluded that an acre-foot
of water is substantially more valuable on farmland in Nebraska than
Kansas." 08 But rather than taking this fact as a reason to permit Nebraska
to take and pay, Kagan treats the efficiency of the breach as a reason for
additional deterrence.
Possessing the privilege of being upstream, Nebraska can
(physically, though not legally) drain all the water it wants from
the Republican River. And the higher value of water on Nebraska's
farmland than on Kansas's means that Nebraska can take water
that under the Compact should go to Kansas, pay Kansas actual
damages, and still come out ahead. That is nearly a recipe for
breach-for an upstream State to refuse to deliver to its
downstream neighbor the water to which the latter is entitled....
In such circumstances, a disgorgement award appropriately
reminds Nebraska of its legal obligations, deters future violations,
and promotes the Compact's successful administration.' 09
In order to reach this conclusion, the Kagan relies in part on section 39 of
the Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. 0 But that is
a very thin reed. Section 39 lacks support in US case law and, as Justice
Scalia observes, "should be given no weight whatever as to the current
state of the law, and no more weight regarding what the law ought to be
than the recommendations of any respected lawyer or scholar."'
If there is a good argument for the majority's decision, it is that Kansas
and Nebraska were not playing the game of efficient breach. Kagan
observes that interstate water compacts are created in the shadow of the
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Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to equitably apportion streams.
Given that context, "it is difficult to conceive that a downstream State
would trade away its right to our equitable apportionment if, under such an
agreement, an upstream State could avoid its obligations or otherwise
continue overreaching."ll 2 Going beyond the opinion, one might observe
that interstate water compacts are not so much value-generating exchanges
as attempts to agree upon a solution to a zero-sum division game. Given
the circumstances in which the compacts occur, states are unlikely to have
the preferences that the theory of efficient breach assigns to parties. From
the perspective of the theory of efficient breach, Kansas v. Nebraska
employs backwards logic and appears to come out exactly the wrong way.
But there is a good argument that it gets the parties' ex ante preferences
right.
Whether or not a practice of efficient beach is a morally satisfying one,
the theory of efficient breach does not capture everything that is
happening in all contractual transactions. More to the point, it does not
capture everything that the law should take notice of. When only one party
is playing the game of efficient beach, there is a risk that the party who
believes she has contracted for performance will suffer unanticipated
losses. When neither party is playing, courts should not apply its logic.

Whether one finds the practice of efficient breach morally sound or
morally corrupt, one should keep the theory's assumptions and limits in
view. Although the sophisticates in the society depicted in La R~gle du
Jeu might think that they are playing a game of mutual enjoyment in
which no one is harmed, as the plot unfolds it becomes clear that they are
operating on false premises. It turns out that their practice of infidelity
harms participants by engendering attitudes that undermine more authentic
relationships, and that it also harms those who do not understand or wish
to participate in the practice by disappointing their expectations. When
courts endorse the attitudes the efficient breach theory recommends in
transactions that do not accord with the theory's assumptions, they are
neither attuned to the moral situation nor likely to advance party welfare.
CONCLUSION: STORYTELLING AND LEGAL CULTURE

Sometimes a story becomes true through its telling. So too with legal
theory. Legal theories do not stand outside of the social practices they
describe. We teach them in law schools and they find their way into
judicial opinions. The moral community a successful legal theory
imagines can influence legal culture. This means that legal theories should
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be held accountable for, among other things, the moral value of the
communities they depict and, in many cases, thereby affirm.
The theory of efficient breach is, among other things, a story many of us
tell first-year law students. And it is well suited to the project of
introducing students to the law. Contract law does not always track
morality, and if a lawyer is to competently advise her client, she must
know when they come apart." 3 First-year law students must learn to
sometimes put aside their intuitions about what morality requires so they
can identify what the law demands. The theory of efficient breach is a
good tool for teaching those skills. It disrupts untutored expectations about
what the law requires of parties, about how we should choose legal rules,
and about the sorts of obligations sophisticated parties themselves might
want.
At the same time, one should pay attention to the lessons they, and we,
draw from the theory. The theory of efficient breach is a just-so story
about an important band of contract law: agreements between risk-neutral
self interested rational utility maximizers transacting against a specific
factual background. The advantage of the story in the classroom is that it
asks students to adopt a perspective that might otherwise be foreign to
them. It is, however, not the perspective of all contracting parties. Nor
does it capture all that is going on in contractual relationships. Whether or
not the theory is immoral, it is anemic.
This brings us back to the benefits of bringing legal theory into
conversation with literature, theater and film. Wordsworth writes, "We
murder to dissect."ll4 The apothegm applies to legal theory. Private law
theorists commonly seek to explain the complexity of the common law by
way of a small number of simple principles, on the model of unified
theories in the natural sciences. As a result, the stories they tell are often
simple ones.
One way to identify the stories' assumptions and limits is to construct
alternative narratives. Carol Rose's stories about the other-regarding acts
that go into creating and maintaining a law of property, for example,
effectively demonstrate the gaps in more familiar theory-stories about the
origin of property.'
Another approach, which I have taken here, is to bring a theory into
conversation with work from a different genre. Literature, theater and film
often provide more morally complex and multi-layered stories. James
Boyd White observes that a Platonic dialogue or play by Shakespeare
113.
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"does not work automatically, to transfer knowledge or concepts or
arguments, or to serve as a set of directions, but offers the reader a
complex experience of thought and judgment, an experience to which it
invites and calls him but does not compel him."' 16 Film, with its mixture
of word and image, is perhaps especially well suited to depicting moral
complexity and multiple or shifting meanings. It is no easy thing to
transpose that way of thinking into legal theory. The law often demands
brighter lines, and one of the jobs of legal theory is to help draw them. But
the comparison at least helps us understand the limitations of the genre,
and can illuminate what a given theory captures about the world and what
it does not.
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